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Interest Analysis-The Sands of Confusion
Alfred S. Pelaez*
Once more the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has, with great solemnity, decided that Tweedle Dum is indeed of greater significance than
Tweedle Dee.' Not to be outdone by their elevated brethren, law professors have already begun stumbling over each other in efforts to reweigh our heroes on what each believes to be a better calibrated scale
than that used by the Court.
The matter started innocently enough. John Shaposka, Jr. offered to
ride his classmate, Michael Cipolla, home from school on the afternoon
of January 24, 1966, and the offer was accepted. On the way to Michael's home, John's automobile was involved in a collision and
Michael sued John in a Pennsylvania court to recover for the injuries
he sustained in that collision. The problems arise from the facts that
(a) Michael lived in Pennsylvania, which is where the parties were
headed at the time of the occurrence; (b) John lived in Delaware, and
the automobile he was driving was registered, garaged and insured in
that state; (c) the accident happened on the Delaware side of the border
separating the two adjacent states. To further complicate matters, a
Delaware guest statute prohibits a guest from recovering damages from
his driver-host in the absence of wilful or wanton misconduct; and
Pennsylvania permits guests in motor vehicles to recover damages from
their hosts upon a showing of simple negligence.
Faced with these facts, Justice Cohen and a majority of the Court
concluded that there was indeed a true conflict of interests and that,
weighing the contacts of each state "on a qualitative rather than quantitative scale" the substantive law of Delaware was properly applied.
In reaching this decision, the Court thought that Pennsylvania's only
relevant contact was that the injured party resided in Pennsylvania.
Delaware, on the other hand, was the domicile of the defendant; the
place where the vehicle in which the boys were riding was registered,
* A.B., LL.B., University of Pittsburgh; LLM. Yale University; Professor of Law,
Duquesne University. The author, who has not taught conflicts for some five years, disclaims possessing any expertise in this area so thoroughly muddled by experts. He writes,
instead, as a confused layman exuding sympathy for the judges, lawyers and litigants
caught in the middle of the scholarly maze that conflict of laws has become.
1. See Cipolla v. Shaposka (1970) 489 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854.
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housed and insured; and, the situs of the accident. Each of these contacts was considered relevant.
Justice Roberts dissented vigorously, believing the situs of the accident and the domicile of the automobile to be irrelevant contacts
and, thus, that the score was dead-locked and not, as the majority
believed, 3-1 in favor of Delaware. The remainder of Justice Robert's
opinion is dedicated to the establishment of a procedure for breaking
the tie without the necessity of replaying the accident. This, he concludes, can best be achieved by searching for the "better rule of law,"
magnanimously awarding the honors therefor to the Pennsylvania legislature.
While the majority opinion professes to weigh the contacts qualitatively, the opinion gives no indication that this was actually done. The
opinion mentions that Pennsylvania's only relevant contact comes
about as a result of the plaintiff-appellant's being a local resident. It
does not discuss why, and to what extent, this contact is relevant and
makes no effort to weigh this contact against the quantitatively greater
Delaware relevant contacts. Clearly, it is the policy of Pennsylvania to
protect its citizens from negligent hosts. Since an injured person can
represent both a type of lost or diminished resource and, perhaps, an
economic liability whose care may ultimately devolve upon other
Pennsylvania citizens or upon the state if adequate redress is not obtained, Pennsylvania conceivably has a great deal at stake in seeing that
Michael Cipolla receives adequate compensation. Delaware, too, may
have much at stake in the outcome of this litigation. Obviously, its
guest statute was motivated by some policy consideration that it deems
beneficial to its citizenry. While the majority does not even hint at the
underlying policy the Delaware statute is intended to serve, Justice
Roberts in his dissent concludes that "[T]he sole purpose of the Delaware guest statute . . . 'is to protect one who generously, without accruing benefit, has transported another in his motor vehicle.... , 2

Further, if the majprity is to be believed, permitting plaintiff to
recover in this case might cause insurance premiums assessed to all
Delaware motorists to increase, thus giving Delaware another basis for
concern. Finally, according to the majority, the accident's occurrence in
Delaware provides that state with an interest, since Delaware may
legitimately strive to assure its residents that they "should not be put
in jeopardy of liability exceeding that created by their state's laws just
2.

Id. at 858.

447

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 9: 446, 1971

because a visitor from a state offering higher protection decides to visit
there."8
But, if we are to believe the majority's statement that choice of law
should be premised on the quality, and not the quantity, of the relevant
contacts, the Court's work should just have begun at the place it
stopped. How significant is the insurance factor? Does the guest statute
really affect insurance rates, and to what extent? Is it more important
to assure reasonable insurance rates for Delaware citizens than to
prevent recovery by a non-negligent guest from his negligent host, thus
potentially increasing the tax burden of Pennsylvania citizens to compensate for the added economic burden precipitated by the uncompensated injury to its citizens?
What weight should we give to enforcing the reasonable expectations
of Delaware citizens that, while driving in their home state, their
liability will not exceed that created by local law? Shouldn't the Court
have made some effort to determine to what extent this is a valid consideration? Do citizens of Delaware actually rely on the presence of a
guest statute and, being assured that it is still in effect, breathe a sigh
of relief? And, if they do, how do you weigh this reliance against Pennsylvania's interests?
These, and many more, questions must be asked and considered if
one is truly to attempt a qualitative evaluation of the relevant contacts.
And there is no indication in the opinion that any questions of this
type were considered by the majority. Thus, clearly, if the Court in
fact did choose the law of the jurisdiction it believed to have the greater
4
interest qualitatively, it did so by some unexplained process.
While the failure of the majority to specify exactly why it concluded
that Delaware's relevant contacts were qualitatively greater than Pennsylvania's provides a basis for criticizing the opinion, it is believed an
even more substantial objection remains. Assuming that a court does
attempt a qualitative analysis, how can this be accomplished? Potatoes
can be weighed against potatoes, or even against squash, and values
rationally assigned. But, can we really weigh interests against interests
3. Id. at 856-857.
4. Even if it is ultimately concluded that a qualitative weighing of interests is the
best means of achieving "conflicts justice," the Court in Cipolla gives no indication of
what considerations it deemed most weighty. Thus, the decision is virtually useless as
an aid in making future appraisals on an interest analysis basis. Lawyers and judges are
left in the dark in attempting to rationally predict how a cause containing all or some
of the same interests, but in a different context, might now be decided in Pennsylvania.
The Court owed it to the bar and to the judges of the Pennsylvania Courts of Common
Pleas to be more specific in discussing the "whys" and "hows" of its conclusions.
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and come up with any worthwhile conclusions-with conclusions that
do any more than spotlight the subjective prejudices, experiences and
beliefs of a majority of a particular court? As Justice Traynor so poignantly stated: "Can you weigh a bushel of horse feathers against next
Thursday?" 5 Unless the interests of one state are so minor as to be
clearly inferior-which was not true in Cipolla-aren'twe just kidding
ourselves in attempting to assign relative values to valueless factors?
Can we, by any known process, look to the facts and sensibly conclude
that, in a host-guest case of this type, a plaintiff's residence in a nonguest statute state is worth 10 points; garaging the vehicle gives a state
3 points; the residence of the defendant in a guest statute state gives
that state 8 points; etcetera? And, unless we can devise a method
capable of rationally assigning measurable values to such interests, what
can be gained from an in-depth comparison of the competing, more
than minimal, relevant interests?
The last two decades have seen monumental advances in the solution
of conflicts cases. Recognition of the false conflict and compelling application of the substantive law of an interested jurisdiction have eliminated most of the more blatant past errors. It is time to recognize,
however, that further quests for purity and certainty-at least at this
stage of our development-endanger destroying the good that has
evolved. Far too many courts in far too many jurisdictions are today
painfully aware that their choice of law opinions are anxiously awaited
by law professors eager to criticize, but unable themselves to offer the
long sought for panacea. Indeed, as the diverse views in this Symposium
illustrate, even the most esteemed of the "experts" are not immune
from attack, and may begin to tread cautiously where once they ran
untrammeledl Continued, and usually justified, criticism without the
creation of a workable solution, however, is not the answer. Indeed, by
pointing out the importance of interests of which the courts were
formerly unaware,- law professors have made the choice of law picture
muddier today than it was five years ago. Much more of this, and even
vested rights will look good to harried jurists and lawyersl To preclude
regression we should cease, or at least deemphasize, the search for absolutism, and strive toward a practical, workable method of solving
conflicts problems that offers a reasonable degree of predictability and
can be utilized effectively by trial judges who must deal with hundreds
5. Justice Traynor acknowledges an indebtedness to Prosser Res Ipsa in California,
37 CALIF. L. Rav. 183, 225 (1949) who in turn acknowledges his indebtedness to an unidentified English judge.
& See A. Twerski, supra this Symposium.
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of other problems during the year, and who should not have to be a
combination of Cavers and Ehrenzweig to achieve acceptable results.
' 7
The solution, in short, cannot be one that measures "conflicts justice
solely in terms of eventually separating out the most interested jurisdiction. It must, to achieve real justice, also concern itself with the
unjustness of placing litigants, attorneys and insurance companies in a
fog of uncertainty that frequently doesn't lift until a decision is rendered by the highest appellate court.
The largely discarded vested rights approach, applying in all instances the law of the situs of the occurrence regardless of applicable
interests, is clearly inconsistent with the goal of achieving conflicts
justice.8 But, it did offer certain undeniable advantages. Immediately
following the occurrence of the accident all concerned parties and their
insurers could rationally place some value on the case and enter into
meaningful settlement negotiations. Or, if it became apparent that
settlement was not imminent or likely, it could rationally be decided
whether the case merited large out of pocket outlays in preparing for
trial. While this predictability was certainly not worth the often heavy
price it extracted, it was undeniably beneficial and attempts should be
made to retain it in arriving at a workable solution for conflicts cases.
As a result of the interest analysis approach taken by the Court in
Cipolla, there is no semblance of predictability remaining in Pennsylvania conflicts law.9 Suppose, for instance, that an identical case arises
except for the fact that the automobile involved in the collision is
owned by the youthful driver's father, and the father is a career military
man only recently transferred to Delaware-a state where he never
before lived-and who expects to be transferred elsewhere in two or
three years?' 0 Or, suppose that the insurance on the automobile is
written by a company insuring only governmental employees and that
its rates are based on the status and level of the government employment, and not on the geographic location where the vehicle is garaged?
7. See D. Cavers, supra this Symposium, for the origin of this most descriptive phrase.
8. See B. CUaRE, Conflicts, Crisis and Confusion in New York, in B. CURIUE, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS, 690 et seq., (1963).

9. While predictability is, at best, uncertain in an interest analysis jurisdiction, the
problem is compounded in Pennsylvania by the failure of the Court to give some indication of the factors it deemed relevant in assessing the weight to place upon the
various competing interests. See note 4,supra.
10. Or, suppose he was a corporate executive who, similarly, fully expected to be
transferred; or, indeed, had already received his "traveling orders" to another state,
effective some time in the future. Would, in all these instances, the weight given to
residence or domicile be identical?
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What value would you, representing either the plaintiff or defendant,
place on this new case? Would you feel justified in spending thousands
of dollars for photographs; statements from highway safety experts;
depositions; X-ray and medical examinations; etcetera? Or would you
attempt to prevail on as low a budget as possible? None of these "practical" problems can be ignored if we are truly to search for "conflicts
justice." That term clearly transcends the goals of a system whose
primary concern is to make sure that the law of the most interested
jurisdiction is applied to the dispute, and must also encompass the
achievement of some measure of predictability.
As a result of Cipolla there is certainty only in the unlikely event
an identical case is once more brought before the Pennsylvania courts.
In all other legitimate tort conflicts cases the parties-and the Commonwealth, which must foot the heavy costs of litigation where cases
cannot be settled before trial-are deprived of a reasonable opportunity
to effectuate a fair settlement; and one lawyer will have the difficult
job of explaining to his client why the principles of "conflicts justice"
prevented his recovery. We can, and must, do betterl We must strive
for a solution that accommodates both the goal of applying the law of
an interested jurisdiction and the goal of providing all involved parties
with a reasonable degree of certainty and predictability so that they
might fairly and properly evaluate the claim. Additionally, this accommodation process should be one that can be easily and fairly applied by
the harried and overworked trial judges of our Courts of Common
Pleas.
It is my belief that, in tort conflicts cases, utilization of an interested
lex fori test most nearly meets all these goals and achieves the best accommodation of the often competing interests of predictability and
interest analysis. Such a test would compel the forum, whenever it has a
legitimate, somewhat more than minimal, interest in the cause, to apply
its own substantive law. The initial (and frequently the only) determination that the trial judge will have to make in applying the interested
lex fori rule is simply whether the interests of the forum state are more
than minimal or, perhaps more accurately, that the interests of some
other state don't clearly predominate or overwhelm the local interests."1
11. For an illustration of judicial willingness to subordinate the minimal interests
of the forum and apply the law of a clearly more interested jurisdiction see Justice Traynor's opinion in Bernkrant v. Fowler 55 Cal.2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
See also Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. 358 U.S. 354 (1959); and B.
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It is believed that these types of broad threshold "interest analyses" are
most easily made-and predicted by attorneys and insurance companies-and will not cause the confusion that of necessity results from
the refined screening of interests compelled by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Cipolla. Once it is determined by the court that the
forum state has a sufficient interest to pass through this coarse-meshed
sieve, it proceeds by applying its own substantive law. If the interests
of the forum are too slight to traverse even this sieve, and there is only
one other interested jurisdiction, the forum would then apply the law
of that interested forum. Only if the local interests are nil or minimal
and there are two or more other jurisdictions with legitimate, more
than minimal, interests in the matter would the court be confronted
with the dilemma it itself created in Cipolla and have to either "weigh
interests qualitatively" or, as Justice Roberts would have them do,
select the law of that interested jurisdiction with the most enlightened
legislators or juristsl The chances of this third contingency occurring,
however, appear remote indeed since, if any other alternatives are
available, only the most imprudent lawyer would commence suit in a
jurisdiction where he is unable to predict the law that will be applied.
Utilization of the interested lex fori approach in Cipolla would
clearly have compelled the Pennsylvania courts to apply Pennsylvania
substantive law. Had the suit been commenced in Delaware, that state
would most certainly have applied its substantive law had it utilized
this test. And, most important, all counsel and insurance companies
involved could easily, and with considerable assurance, have predicted
such results immediately following the occurrence of the accident. The
advantages of such an approach are clear. In most cases application of
an interested lex fori approach will: (1) assure that the law of an interested forum is applied to the cause without the necessity of the forum
court's having to undertake that most laudable task, but one all courts
are clearly incapable of performing, of weighing the competing interests
against one another in an attempt to discover which are the "weightiest," or most significant; (2) preclude the possibility of the forum
reaching the conclusion that the "interest score" is tied and compel it,
as Justice Roberts would, to attempt to choose the "better rule of law,"
a function totally beyond the competence or experience of most judges
and one which the people of all political subdivisions of this nation
CuruE, The Silver Oar and all That: A Study of the Romero Case, in B.
SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws at p. 361 (1963).
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have wisely entrusted to members of another co-equal branch of government; (3) provide-very soon after the occurrence--considerably more
certainty and predictability than has yet, or perhaps can ever, be
achieved by an approach totally dependent upon the weighing of competing interests, thus enabling all interested parties to rationally place
a value on the case and begin settlement and trial preparation; and (4)
eliminate the need for interested state forums to make difficult, if not
impossible, distinctions between substantive and procedural law.
This is not to say that utilization of an interested lex fori approach
does not also have draw-backs. One often cited objection is that it
permits, and indeed encourages, forum shopping. And, to far too many
lawyers and judges for far too many years, forum shopping has remained
just slightly less reprehensible than wife beating. However, the ability
of any litigant to forum shop is severely limited by the requirements of
due process, personal jurisdiction and venue. And, should additional
protection be needed it may possibly be found in the ability to have
many conflicts cases that are commenced in state courts removed to
federal courts where, if cause can be shown, they can be transferred
2
to other, or more convenient, forums. While Van Dusen v. Barrack'
might compel the transferee state to apply the conflicts law of the
transferor forum when that forum is an interested jurisdiction and the
defendant sought the transfer, there is no indication that the result
would be the same if, for example, the transferor forum had no interest
in the cause.' 3 When filtered through these protective screens forum
shopping loses much of its imagined stigma. It can only be utilized by
one who claims that, through little or no fault of his own, another's
conduct has caused him injury. 14 And even this allegedly wronged
individual can only browse in forums that have previously been deemed
proper by legislative or judicial fiat. Furthermore, it is time opponents
of forum shopping in conflicts cases realize that this practice already

exists on a broad scale and has, indeed, even achieved a modicum of
judicial acceptability. Cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of state
12. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
13. Justice Goldberg, in Van Dusen v. Barrack, specifically stated that, in compelling
the transferee court to apply the conflicts law binding upon the transferor forum, the
Court did "not and need not consider whether in all cases § 1404(a) would require the
application of the law of the transferor, as opposed to the transferee, State. We do not
attempt to determine whether, for example, the same considerations would govern if
a plaintiff sought transfer under § 1404(a) or if it was contended that the transferor
State would simply have dismissed the action on the ground of forum non conveniens."
(Emphasis supplied) 376 U.S. at 639, 640.
14. But see the discussion of "sham" plaintiffs, infra page 399.
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and federal courts are clearly illustrative of this fact. Any lawyer who
today has a case that can be commenced in either a state or federal
forum (which is true of a disproportionately large percentage of conflicts cases) would be foolhardy to conclude that Erie v. Tompkins 5 and
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 16 make it irrelevant whether a federal or
state forum is selected; that the result will be the same in either case.
What remains of the Erie-York doctrine in the wake of Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc.' 7 and Hanna v. Plummer"s is not alto-

gether clear. What is clear, however, is that today there are limitations
on the power of a federal district court to apply state substantive law
on the basis of an "outcome determinative" test alone; and, even more
clearly, that the procedural and evidentiary changes spawned by Hanna
not only make a mockery of "outcome determination" but, additionally, make intelligent "forum shopping" between state and federal
forums an absolute necessity for all prudent lawyers. An example
utilizing the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence clearly illustrates the
permissibility-indeed, the necessity-of a plaintiff's engaging in limited
forum shopping. Suppose the defendant in the Cipolla case had died
from the injuries sustained in the collision, and that plaintiff was the
only surviving witness. Suppose, further, that Pennsylvania has a Dead
Man's statute which prevents a plaintiff from testifying against the
interests of a deceased defendant. If plaintiff brings such a suit in a
Pennsylvania state court he will be unable to testify about the defendant's negligent conduct and, in all probability, suffer a non-suit. If, on
the other hand, he begins his suit "up the street" in the federal district
court and the proposed federal evidence rules have by then been
adopted, the Dead Man's statute will be inapplicable, and the plaintiff
can testify in detail and at length as to the decedent's negligence in
driving his automobile.' 9 Obviously, a lawyer able to choose between
a state and federal forum in such a case would be grossly negligent if
he failed to intelligently select his forum. This illustration using the
proposed federal evidence rules is not an isolated example. It is simply
illustrative of one of a plethora of situations where a litigant, aware
15.
16.

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
326 U.S. 99 (1945).

18.

380 U.S. 460 (1965).

17. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
19. See Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 601 and the Advisory Committee's Note
thereto contained in the PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOsED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES (March 1969), which makes clear that State
Dead Man's Acts are to have no applicability to causes within the scope of the proposed
federal rules.
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of the differences in federal and state procedure and evidence, can now
or will in the future be able to greatly affect the outcome of his case by
astute, and entirely permissible, selection of the appropriate forum--or,
to phrase it in the legal vernacular, by forum shoppingl These gross
departures from Erie and York have not been condemned as depriving
litigants of "procedural" or "evidentiary" justice. Nor, in my opinion,
will application of an interested lex fori approach and the resultant
limited forum shopping it may spawn deprive litigants of "conflicts
justice."
A second possible draw-back to an interested lex fori approach, and
one that is more valid than the objection to forum shopping, is that it
places a premium on winning the race to the court-house door, with
the "spoils" of controlling the applicable law going to the swiftest. It
is one thing to give a limited opportunity to forum shop to a party who
reasonably believes that he has been injured because of another's
negligence. As long as one of two or more parties must have the opportunity of chosing the forum, and thus in large measure controlling
the applicable law, the principles of risk allocation clearly dictate that
the choice should be given to that party who claims wrongful injury
caused by the others. And, where two or more parties reasonably claim
wrongful injury and, as a result, one commences suit in a forum which
will hear the merits of all the claims, the slower parties to the courthouse should have no basis to complain since their rights to choose the
forum are no greater than those of their more diligent adversary. It is another, and more dangerous thing, however, to give this opportunity to
select a favorable forum to one who does not have a reasonable basis to
seek a judgment in his favor and who is commencing suit solely to shut
off or diminish the rights of a legitimate claimant. 20 Suppose, for in20. The argument can be made that the illegitimate or sham claimant should be
permitted to commence the suit since all he is asking the forum to do is effectuate its
policy by barring the true plaintiff from recovering damages. Thus, this argument would
continue, it is unfair to ask the forum to stay or dismiss the proceedings so that a result
the forum opposes can be obtained by the true plaintiff in another forum.
The best answer to this argument is that, policy notwithstanding, the judicial system
has been developed to allow those who believe they have been wronged to seek redress
in the courts and to allow those allegedly causing those wrongs to come forth and defend
against the charges levied. See, generally, Osborn v. Bank of the United States 9 Wheat
738, 824 (1824), providing that the "right to sue is anterior to" the making of a defense.
To utilize the courts neither to present nor defend alleged legitimate claims, but solely
to prevent such claims from being presented, seems to pervert the entire system. And,
"weighed qualitatively," the forum's interest in protecting its domiciliary should be subverted to its interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial systeml
While this reasoning may be said to indicate a "plaintiff bias," it can be argued that
if this be so the entire judicial system--especially in the area of concurrent state and
federal jurisdiction with the degree of choice this may give a plaintiff-also is somewhat
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stance, that both Delaware and Pennsylvania utilized an interested lex
fori approach for solving tort conflicts cases and that, immediately following the occurrence of the accident precipitating this article, John Shaposka commenced suit as the plaintiff in a Delaware court. Suppose, further,
that the applicable procedure makes it compulsory for Cipolla to file a
counter-claim in that action in the Delaware forum and that judgments
in that cause would be res judicata in any other forum. Since, obviously,
Delaware's guest statute would preclude recovery by Michael Cipolla
in such action, all that the latter could do would be to bring suit elsewhere if he could and attempt to push it to trial before the Delaware
suit. And, if he fails to do so, application of the interested lex fori approach will have worked to deprive him of the opportunity of bringing
his cause in a forum where he could be heard on the merits. Thus, by
winning the race to trial Shaposka, with no reasonable or legitimate
cause of action against Cipolla,2 1 could prevent the latter from having
his cause heard in a jurisdiction which would give him the opportunity
to prove negligence and obtain a recovery.
There is no doubt that, as illustrated, the interested lex fori approach
is subject to abuse by "sham" plaintiffs who have no reasonable expectation of recovering a judgment for damages, but seek only to compel the
"true" plaintiff to litigate the merits of his cause in a jurisdiction where
he cannot obtain recovery, or where recovery will be more difficult or
damages limited. And, while it is in accord with the concepts of risk
allocation to permit a legitimate or "true" plaintiff to select his forum
and attempt to prove negligence, it contravenes those concepts to
present this choice to a "sham" plaintiff who cannot reasonably hope
for a verdict in his favor and who has commenced suit only to block,
limit or make more difficult the "defendant's" more plausible claim.
indicative of a "plaintiff bias." Before a defendant can be entitled to an opportunity
to present a fair defense, the plaintiff must be provided with a fair opportunity to present his claim!
Closely related to the problem of the "sham" plaintiff is the ability of a litigantwhether or not he alleges to be wronged-to, in some instances, obtain a declaratory
judgment that might bind the true plaintiff. It stands to reason that use of the declaratory judgment procedure should not be permitted to encourage court-house races any
more than use of the "sham" plaintiff device should be sanctioned. See Baade, CounterRevolution or Alliance For Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law
Process 46 Texas L. Rev. 141, at 175-178 (1967).
21. It is interesting to note that, while the Delaware Guest Statute would preclude
Cipolla from effecting a recovery in Delaware, that statute would not deprive the host
from recovering from a guest whose negligence-by distracting the driver, for instancecaused the injury. Thus, the mere filing of the suit by John Shaposka would not illustrate
that he is a "sham" plaintiff in this case. This fact could only be determined upon the
completion of some discovery procedures.
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The fact that such abuses of the interested lex fori approach can occur,
however, is not a sufficient reason to scrap a procedure that otherwise
seems to effectuate a workable accommodation between "conflicts justice," predictability, and ease of application. First of all, it is somewhat
cynical to suppose that every person in the position of a John Shaposka,
or even a large percentage of such persons, will attempt to become "sham"
plaintiffs. And, secondly, it is inconceivable that the courts cannot and
will not separate out the obvious sham plaintiffs from those with
reasonable claims and refuse to litigate the causes of the former. Suppose, for instance, that the "plaintiff" in a conflicts case brings his
action in an interested jurisdiction where neither party could recover
because of some exclusionary law or evidentiary rule and that suit could
have been commenced in other forums-where one or both of the parties
could have recovered upon a showing of negligence on the part of the
other. That, in and of itself, would be considerable, if not irrefutable,
evidence of the fact that the "plaintiff" is a phony trying only to abuse
the system by winning the race to trial.22 Or, suppose further that in
Cipolla v. Shaposka, John Shaposka commenced suit in the Delaware
state courts where Cipolla could under no circumstances recover but
where, conceivably, Shaposka could recover if he could show the accident occurred as a result of the guest's negligence. If, as the discovery
proceeds, it appears that there is no plausible basis for awarding
recovery to Shaposka, it would be clear that the action was only a sham
and the court should, following a preliminary hearing, either dismiss
the action or stay it pending outcome of an action in another state by
2
the true plaintiff.
In short, judges can, with a minimum of effort, detect the most
blatant, if not all, sham plaintiffs. And, if they are willing to remain
vigilant and do not blink their eyes at obvious attempts to mock the
choice of law process,2 4 the danger of sham plaintiffs should prove more
imagined than real.
22. That the forum where a recovery could not be obtained also has an interest, and
that denying recovery would coincide with that interest, should not alter the fact that
that plaintiff is really a "sham" when he assumes that role. See note 20, supra.
23. See note 21, supra.
24. In rejecting strict interest analysis, I do not also reject the choice of law process.
Clearly, in all true conflicts cases, some method for choosing the applicable law must
be utilized. All I ask is that more emphasis be placed on the practical and jurisdictional
facits of choice of law and less be placed upon an in depth analysis of competing interests.
On the need for flexible rules governing choice of law problems, rather than strict
adherence to a weighing of interests approach, see the interesting article by Professor
Rosenberg in Conflict of Laws Round Table Symposium 49 TXs L. REv. 229 (1971).
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On balance, it seems that an interested lex fori approach comes
nearer to achieving true "conflicts justice" than any approach premised
entirely, or predominately, upon an analysis of competing interests.
Properly applied, it assures that the law of an interested jurisdiction is
applied to the cause; provides the high degree of predictability so vital
to an intelligent appraisal and handling of the case; and is easily
handled by lawyers and judges who cannot be expected to become
conflicts scholars. While it does allow for selective forum shopping, this
practice, as limited by the protective screens, has been widely accepted
and approved in most areas of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction
and cannot even be deemed detrimental, let alone bad "per se."
The solutions predicated primarily upon a weighing of interests
have simply not worked. In searching for "conflicts justice" the academic and judicial community have too frequently overlooked the
plight of litigants and counsel. It is time to put an end to the search
for perfection; to stop jousting with windmills that leave the Don
Quixotes unscathed and beat the Sancho Panzas-and Michael Cipollas-into the inconstant sands of confusion.
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